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Abstract
Children’s questions may reveal a great deal about the characteristics of objects they consider to
be conceptually important. Thirty-two preschool children were given opportunities to ask
questions about unfamiliar artifacts and animals. The children asked ambiguous questions such as
“What is it?” about artifacts and animals alike. However, they were more likely to ask about the
functions of artifacts, but about category membership, food choices, and typical locations of
animals. They never asked questions about either artifacts or animals that would be considered
inappropriate by adults. The results indicate that children hold different expectations about the
types of information important for categorizing living and artifact kinds. Young children conceive
of artifacts in terms of functions, but conceive of animals in terms of biologically appropriate
characteristics. Such results speak to debates about the role of function in children’s biological
reasoning and to accounts of children’s artifact concepts.
For adults, a core property that determines an artifact’s identity is the purpose for which it
was originally designed, an intuition derived from what many researchers have referred to as
the design stance (Bloom, 1996; Dennett, 1987; German & Johnson, 2002; Keil, 1989). The
centrality of functional design is said to be exclusive to artifact kinds and perhaps to animal
parts, and for adults it does not tend to extend to whole animals (Keil, 1995). Controversies
arise, however, about the role of function and design in young children’s concepts of living
and human-made kinds. Do young children also see function as central to understanding
artifacts, and, more significantly, do they adopt a different stance toward animals?
The current study brings new evidence to bear on both developmental issues. Following
Kemler Nelson, Egan, and Holt (2004), we examine the questions that children ask about
objects. Kemler Nelson et al. investigated the intent of children’s ambiguous questions about
novel artifacts, such as “What is it?” Such questions could be requests for names or,
alternatively, requests for information about object kinds. The results suggested that the
inquiries were intended to elicit kind information. In particular, when ambiguous questions
elicited names, 3- and 4-year-olds frequently followed up with questions about the objects’
functions. Ambiguous questions eliciting information about function were never followed up
with requests for names.
If children’s questions about novel artifacts are intended to elicit information about
conceptual kinds, then one can adapt the questioning procedure to address a new issue. By
exploring non-ambiguous questions children ask about artificial and living kinds, one can
gain insight into the kinds of properties children consider fundamental to conceptual
categorization in each domain.
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Children as young as 3 years old have intuitions about essential properties of living kinds
and can distinguish them from artifacts (Gelman, 2003). Extending the name of an animal
permits extension of other essential properties of the category, such as manner of breathing
(Gelman, 1988), aspects of growth (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Inagaki & Sugiyama, 1988;
Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish, & McCormick, 1991), and inheritance (Springer & Keil, 1989,
1991). Three-year-olds also understand that traits of biological entities serve the purpose of
enhancing survival, and traits of artifacts serve the social purposes of benefiting people
(Keil, 1992, 1994).
Still, there is debate concerning the pervasiveness of functional design in children’s concepts
of living kinds. One proposal is that young children “promiscuously” overextend attributions
of function, purpose, and design to all types of objects. Such a tendency is said to stem from
an earlier proclivity to understand the world in terms of intentions, or via a naive
psychology. According to this account, it is natural for children to ask “What is it for?” for
all objects, and children do appear to judge statements of purpose and function as reasonable
for a wide array of objects (Kelemen, 1999a). To make inductive inferences and provide
explanations for the existence and emergence of properties, children might treat living
natural kinds as “quasi-artifacts” (Kelemen, 1999b) and engage the same teleological mode
of construal they use for human-made objects. Alternatively, children may have an
autonomous biological mode of thought and limit teleological reasoning to features of living
entities that have adaptive value (Keil, 1992, 1994). According to this discriminative-
teleology account, even young children restrict purpose-based thinking to artifacts and
adaptive parts of animals.
If function and design are prominent elements of children’s thinking about animals, as the
promiscuous-teleology proposal suggests, then one would expect children to be curious and
ask questions about animals’ purposes and functions, just as they do for artifacts (Kemler
Nelson et al., 2004). Accordingly, the goal of the current research was to compare children’s
requests for kind information about novel artifacts and animals. We expected this
comparison to shed light on whether or not children privilege different types of information
for living and artificial things.
METHOD
Participants
The participants were 32 preschool children (mean age = 4.62 years, range: 3.38–5.28
years), 12 girls and 20 boys. Data from 6 additional children were discounted because of
shyness, speech delays, or unwillingness to complete the protocol. Participants were
recruited from local preschools and a participant database at Yale University.
Materials
Photographs—Pictures of eight unfamiliar animals and eight novel artifacts were selected
from the Internet and from Kemler Nelson’s previous studies (e.g., Kemler Nelson et al.,
2004). Their unfamiliarity was confirmed by a group of adults. Each object was removed
from its original context (habitat or support) using Adobe Photoshop and presented on a
plain background, as shown in Figure 1.
Game Presentation—A game display was created in PowerPoint and presented on a
laptop computer. The initial display was a screen containing a 3 × 4 matrix of boxes with
question marks. Clicking a question mark prompted a new screen with a picture of an animal
or artifact. The stimulus set included six animals and six artifacts. Clicking on a location that
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said “Play Again” brought back the initial game screen, but without the options that had
already been selected for view.
A similar training game included an initial screen containing only a 2 × 2 arrangement of
two animals and two artifacts.
Procedure
The children were told that they would be seeing pictures of new things, and that they could
ask questions about them. To elicit curiosity about the display and make the children
comfortable, we used a humanlike puppet to demonstrate the game. With the training screen
in view, the puppet chose a box and looked at the screen inquisitively while the
experimenter clicked on the corresponding question mark. When the picture was revealed,
the experimenter encouraged a question, saying “Wow, look at that! What do you want to
know about that thing?” The puppet and experimenter inaudibly whispered questions and
answers about the picture to each other three times to show it was acceptable to ask multiple
questions about each object. Questions and answers were not spoken aloud, to prevent
training on particular types of questions.
When the experimenter indicated it was the child’s turn, the child chose a box, which then
revealed a picture. The experimenter exclaimed, “Wow! That’s cool. What do you want to
know about that thing?” If the child did not respond, the experimenter asked if there was
anything the child wanted to know about the picture. As a last resort, the experimenter said
that asking questions would help the puppet learn about the object.
The experimenter always answered the children’s questions. Ambiguous questions (e.g.,
“What is it?”) always elicited the entity’s name. All other questions were answered with
appropriate information. After answering the first question, the experimenter asked if the
child had additional questions. The trial continued until the child indicated he or she did not
have more questions or asked to move on. Then the initial screen was brought up, and the
child chose another box. The procedure was repeated for the remaining two training boxes.
After training, the experimenter brought up the game screen and told the child that he or she
would see new items even more interesting than the earlier ones. Then the procedure was
repeated, just as in the training phase.
The children were randomly assigned to one of two picture arrangements. The second
arrangement was a mirror image of the first along the diagonal. The children were allowed
to choose the boxes in any order they desired. All children saw all 12 pictures in the display.
RESULTS
Overall, 834 questions were asked, an average of 26.1 per child. Seven hundred eight
questions concerned whole objects (321 initial questions and 387 follow-ups), and 126
concerned parts (24 initial questions and 102 follow-ups). Questions about whole objects
were coded into several categories; by adult standards, some of these types of questions are
appropriate for inquiring about both animals and artifacts, whereas others are appropriate for
only animals or artifacts.
Questions Appropriate for Both Animals and Artifacts
The top panel of Table 1 lists the types of questions appropriate for both kinds of objects.
These include ambiguous requests for names or information about kinds (e.g., “What is
it?”), requests for names (e.g., “What is it called?”), questions about nonspecific functions or
behaviors (e.g., “What does it do?”) and guesses about such actions (e.g., “Does it turn?” or
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“Does it swim?”), guesses about category membership (e.g., “Is it a bear?” or “Is it
scissors?”), and questions about niche or location (e.g., “Where does it live?” or “Where do
you find it?”). For each type of question, the table shows the number of initial and follow-up
queries, listed separately for animals and artifacts.
The total number of initial or follow-up questions did not differ reliably between animals
and artifacts. Moreover, at a finer level of analysis, the number of ambiguous questions and
name requests did not differ between the two kinds. However, despite being appropriate to
ask of both kinds, some question types occurred at different rates for animals and artifacts.
Questions and guesses about functions and behaviors, taken together, were more common
for artifacts than animals, F(1, 31) = 16.55, prep = .96, η2 = .35, for initial questions and F(1,
31) = 18.58, prep = .96, η2 = .38, for follow-ups. By contrast, more animals than artifacts
elicited category guesses, F(1, 31) = 5.39, prep = .91, η2 = .15, for initial questions and F(1,
31) = 6.86, prep = .93, η2 = .18, for follow-ups. Additionally, more animals than artifacts
prompted follow-ups about niche or location, F(1, 31) = 4.31, prep = .89, η2 = .12.
It is useful to partition guesses about functions and behaviors according to whether they
concerned actions that can be sensibly predicated (by adults) of either kind (e.g., turning) or
actions that can be sensibly predicated of only one kind or the other (e.g., climbing trees or
cutting). The frequencies of these types of guesses are shown in the bottom panel of Table 1.
Note that children never guessed about one kind a predicate that was solely applicable to the
other kind. For example, types of behaviors expected of artifacts were not guessed for
animals. Kind-specific guesses accounted for virtually all the children’s guesses for animals.
Although the same was not true for artifacts, fewer actions associated with artifacts are kind-
specific in general.
Questions Appropriate for Artifacts
The second panel of Table 1 lists types of questions that, by adult standards, are appropriate
to ask only about whole objects that are artifacts. These include questions about intended
function (e.g., “What is this for?”), guesses about intended function (e.g., “Is this for X-
ing?”), and questions about typical use (“How does this work?”). Although these types of
questions were not asked frequently, no such questions were ever asked about animals,
whereas they sometimes occurred in reference to artifacts.
Questions Appropriate for Animals
The third panel of Table 1 shows the frequency of questions that, by adult standards, apply
appropriately only to animals: questions about eating behavior and reproduction. Questions
about eating behavior were asked with moderate frequency for animals, but questions of
both types never occurred for artifacts.
Questions About Parts
We also inspected children’s questions about parts. Overall, both the number of initial
questions and the number of follow-up questions about parts were similar for animals and
artifacts. Of specific interest is whether children asked questions about purposes and
functions of animal parts more frequently than they inquired about functions and behaviors
of whole animals. For all children who asked questions about animal parts, we computed the
proportion of their part questions that were about functions, and we compared these
proportions with the proportions of questions about whole animals that were about functions
and behaviors. Children asked proportionally more function questions about animal parts (M
= .55, SD = .45) than wholes (M = .12, SD = .17), t(16) = 3.77, prep = .98, η2 = .47. In
contrast, there was no difference in the proportion of function questions asked about artifact
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parts (M = .66, SD = .369) and wholes (M = .51, SD = .206), t(10) =1.20, prep = .67, η2 = .
13.
DISCUSSION
Our central finding concerns the distinction between animals and artifacts in preschool
children’s lines of questioning about novel objects, and the relevance of this distinction to
disagreements about the role of teleological reasoning in children’s thinking about biological
concepts. We found that preschool children seek out different information about animals and
artifacts. As Kemler et al. (2004) found, preschoolers frequently asked about the functions
of artifacts. However, they did not indiscriminately impute design and function to biological
kinds. Accordingly, the current findings support the discriminative-teleology proposal (Keil,
1992, 1994), rather than the promiscuous-teleology proposal (Kelemen, 1999a, 1999b).
Children appear to understand that different kinds of abstract relations are essential to the
domains of artifacts and animals, and their questions reveal a deep-seated conceptual
contrast between animals and artifacts. Children’s questions reveal what they themselves
consider important in creating a new conceptual category. Children were more likely to ask
questions about functions and potential behaviors of artifacts than to ask questions about
functions and potential behaviors of animals. Questions sensible to ask of either kind, such
as “What does it do?” occurred more often for artifacts than animals, an indication that
children consider function to be more central to concepts of artifacts than to concepts of
animals. Function questions were more frequent for animal parts than for whole animals.
Additionally, children occasionally asked what artifacts were designed for or how they
worked, but never made such inquiries about animals. In contrast, children were more likely
to ask where animals typically were found than where artifacts typically were found. This
question, although certainly sensible to ask about artifacts, does not strike children as
conceptually important to learning about novel artifacts. Children also asked about
properties that could pertain only to animals, such as eating habits and reproduction, and
focused these queries appropriately and exclusively toward animals in the stimulus set.
Preschool children may not be able to verbalize the abstract differences between causal
patterns associated with living kinds and with artifacts, but this inability should not be
confused with problems in understanding such differences or with an interpretive system
that applies in the same way to these two kinds. Instead, as evidenced in their questions,
preschoolers show a rich and sharply contrasting pattern of differences in their expectations
about the kinds of information important for learning about these two kinds. Further, the
questions cluster together in ways that suggest coherent sets of expectations about the two
kinds. Thus, at a young age, children have a clear sense of how explanatory systems differ
for these very broad and abstract categories that represent one of the most important
contrasts in the world.
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Fig. 1.
Pictures and descriptions of the stimuli.
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